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Abstract  
Interest in dyslexia as a topic of discussion in education, and in the media, runs through peaks  
and troughs. Dyslexic students in higher education must navigate their way through the possible  
meanings attached to the label, appropriating some and rejecting others, yet needing the label as a  
means to access support. The aim of this paper is to explore the ways in which dyslexic  
university students constructed dyslexia and being dyslexic as moral issues during two focus 
 group conversations. These conversations were discursively analysed with reference to  
Gee (2005) and Willig (2008). Three key themes emerged following analysis:  the interaction  
between the power of the grade as a marker of worth and the status of the dyslexia label; the  
tensions between acknowledging difficulties with writing and the construction of high literacy  
as morally aspirational; and the uncertain, yet persistent, construction of dyslexia as a valuable  
label and a moral good. 
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Introduction  
 Dyslexia is widely described as an innate cognitive or neurological deficiency which has an 
impact upon reading ability (Nicolson and Fawcett, 2008). However, according to certain 
leading figures in the field, ‘understandings of dyslexia are often impoverished, misleading 
and incorrect’ (Elliott & Grigorenko, 2014b: 579). There are ongoing disagreements about 
what exactly dyslexia is and where it comes from; how prevalent it is; whether it is one thing 
or many; how it is identified; and how this knowledge should inform policy and education 
(Stanovich, 2005; Elliott & Grigorenko, 2014a; Ho, 2004).   Julian Elliott and Elena 
Grigorenko (2014a) question the meaning of the word from the scientific perspective, and 
consider that we might be better off without it. In a context where such conclusions are 
convoluted and sometimes misrepresented in the mainstream media, it becomes important to 
ask how students labelled as dyslexic manage the varied conceptions of dyslexia they are 
confronted with. The perspective in this paper is that discourses of dyslexia and disability are 
laden with ideological messages about the different moral status of different kinds of learner 
and learning in higher education. Although a label like dyslexia may appear to be a neutral 
one, offering a route to fairer participation, it is partially a product of a long history of 
labelling and sorting of people according to presumed individual differences constructed in 
particular social and political contexts (Danziger, 1990; Ho, 2004; see also Hacking, 1995, on 
the role of moral values in the construction of labels). However, this does not mean the label 
is redundant. A thorough understanding of what the label can mean to people who receive it, 
and an exploration of their related experiences should be essential elements in conversations 
about labelling and participation in education and beyond (Macdonald, 2009) and it is these 
elements which are missing from the perspective of Elliot and Grigorenko summarised 
above.  
 
Psychological categorisation of people thought to be particularly gifted, deficient or 
otherwise not ‘normal’ has a long history (Danziger, 1990). From its conception, psychology 
constructed knowledge about individuals ‘around the pole of abnormality’ (Rose, 1985: 5), 
and so effectively did it do this, that today this knowledge can appear as common sense. 
Labels for those whom were considered intellectually or morally deficient one hundred and 
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fifty years ago, such as ‘idiot’ and ‘moron’, have become part of everyday discourse, and new 
labels have become the formal, psychological and medical categories of person who lie 
outside the ‘norm’ (see the DSM-V, via the American Psychological Association, 2013).  
Although scientifically sanctioned, such labels are not immune from social judgment. 
Dyslexia is one such label, which was not long ago called ‘reading retardation’ (Benton & 
Pearl, 1978), and is still at risk from associations of moral inferiority perhaps partly because 
of historical associations with ‘retardation’ or other physical or mental ‘abnormalities’ and 
moral degradation (Jackson, 1996).  Along with talk of dyslexia as a ‘disease’ (e.g. Rutter, 
1978), and its neat measurement and statistical description following psychometric tests, 
dyslexia arguably became one of those, apparently neutral, ‘things’ made by science and 
meant those labelled became available to ‘education’ (treatment).  
 
Being dyslexic is arguably more socially acceptable than being labelled a ‘garden variety 
poor reader’ which is less specific and more easily connected ideas about moral and 
intellectual inferiority (Gibbs & Elliott, 2010: 298; see also Ho, 2004, for a similar point). 
And indeed there is some overt movement within cognitive psychology towards a more 
positive framing of dyslexia (see Nicolson, 2015).  However, being labelled dyslexic does not 
appear to lead to a smoother or more positive learning experience (Mugnaini et al, 2009). 
Furthermore, dyslexia can still be constructed as morally questionable, in a large part because 
people whose reading and writing skills are considered ‘inadequate’ are perceived as being of 
less value (Tanner, 2009). Those who seek the label (for themselves or their children) have 
also been accused of subscribing to a ‘convenient fiction’ to explain academic struggles 
(McDermott et al. 2006) or lack of achievement (Riddick, 1995). This accusation seems 
particularly likely following periodic proclamations in the media of dyslexia as a myth and an 
excuse (e.g. Daley, 2009). There is also the suggestion that institutions seek the label for their 
students for financial advantage (Soler, 2009).  
 
There are now many students with the label of dyslexia who go to university and who achieve 
their degrees, but their experiences through tertiary education and their identities as dyslexic 
are shaped by the conceptions of dyslexia they take on (Pollack, 2005). Lecturing staff also 
appear to have very different understandings of dyslexia and different perspectives upon what 
adjustments are fair (Cameron and Nunkoosing, 2012). What emerges is a picture of dyslexic 
students navigating their way through learning at university, having to accept the label in 
4 
 
certain contexts and wanting to throw it off in others, while keeping an eye upon how their 
label colours their standing in different environments. The need to demonstrate a high 
standard of literacy in order to prove oneself intellectually and morally seems to be an 
ongoing pressure (Collinson & Penketh, 2009).  Not only is the ability to produce erudite 
‘academic’ writing a sign of status and intelligence, it may also be seen as a sign of wisdom 
and worthiness (Collinson & Penketh, 2013); particularly if there are popular fears about 
diminishing standards of literacy (Lea & Street, 1998). As such, managing the associations 
between dyslexia and struggles with literacy also involves managing cultural assumptions 
about the links between literacy difficulties and potentially diminished value in educational 
contexts.  
 
This paper reports upon the findings of one part of a larger research project which was 
interested in identifying discourses of dyslexia and ideological drivers of talk around dyslexia 
by dyslexic students in higher education. The specific focus here is upon the ways in which 
focus group participants constructed dyslexia and being dyslexic as moral issues. Attention is 
given to the ways in which the participants drew upon discourses which produce high literacy 
and academic success as moral goods, while also managing discourses which reproduce 
historical associations between learning difficulties and low moral or social status. The 
approach taken for this particular section of the research is a version of critical discourse 
analysis which draws upon James-Paul Gee (2005) and Carla Willig (2008), the latter for her 
interest in discursive resources. This approach is not solely focused upon linguistic elements 
of talk, but upon narrative, history and more local contexts. The goal is to use this research as 
a way of opening up conversations within educational institutions around the ideological 
ways we construct one another, and to better recognise the assumptions we make as students 
and educators about people with labels of specific learning disability.  
Methodology  
One of the aims in analysis was to find the ways in which ideology was apparent in the talk 
about dyslexia, and how the participants were therefore reproducing particular discursive 
themes which had histories outside the context in question  (after Billig, 2001). Ideology was 
understood as a wide network of ideas or belief systems (Van Dijk, 2006) that over time have 
become common sense (Carr & Hartnett, 1996), and from which our everyday 
understandings of people and the world may be discursively constructed. Ideology is 
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therefore synonymous with hegemonic discourse, or a ‘weight’ in discourse (Giroux, 1997) 
that might be obscured in everyday talk.  
One way to look for ideology in the text was to follow Willig’s (2008) guidance to identify 
the ways in which the topic is produced from particular ideological perspectives. It is useful 
here, she says, to look at the use of particular words and groups of words which are 
associated with particular discourses. Gee (2005) gives a little more detailed set of questions 
to ask of the text in order to better understand the discursive landscape. He invites the analyst 
to consider which other texts and discourses are being represented or reproduced in the 
transcribed text, and he also asks which relationships (between people, things and ideas) 
seem to be important. Gee’s approach (2005, 2009) allows for recognition that both the 
linguistic form of an utterance and the locally informed meaning of an utterance can be 
important. A word or a phrase may have a widely understood meaning, but this can shift with 
specific local use and it can be differently understood by different groups of people who have 
different shared understandings about the world and their places within it. It is with this 
‘situated’ meaning that the current research was most concerned. Therefore, while linguistic 
elements were part of the story, by no means were these intended to be the primary focus of 
the current research.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
Two focus group conversations with six and seven participants respectively were undertaken, 
recorded and transcribed. Focus groups were chosen over interviews because a primary 
interest was to investigate how the competing discourses of dyslexia which the participants 
brought into the conversation were managed, maintained or resisted through talk. The focus 
group context also allowed the researcher to note how the students positioned themselves and 
each other as dyslexic during the flow of dynamic group conversation. The transcripts were 
examined for the ways in which participants drew upon wider discourses and ideologies 
(Gee, 2005, 2009, and Willig, 2008) to construct dyslexia and themselves as dyslexic 
students.  It is one of the themes which emerged during this second stage of analysis which is 
discussed here. This stage involved careful focus upon each utterance and group of utterances 
in the text with attention to linguistic structure, narrative, word history and meaning, and the 
local context and dynamic conversational interaction. Notes were made in the margins of the 
printed text, and links between different discourses were identified until several key themes 
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emerged.  What I identified as important is my interpretation as the author, and I fully 
acknowledge that many other equally valid interpretations are possible. 
  
Ethics 
The School of Education at The University of Sheffield granted ethical approval for the 
current study. Participants were given an information sheet detailing the aims of the project 
and informing them of the potential benefit and risks to them from taking part in the study.  
The participants were thus made aware that in agreeing to take part in a focus group they 
accepted that their identities would, to some degree, be made known to other participating 
students whom they may inadvertently meet on a future occasion. They were also asked to 
consider that they might hear or share personal experiences that they could find 
uncomfortable or upsetting. The researcher offered detailed information to the ethics board 
on how these issues would be manage. It was made clear to the participants that they could 
withdraw at any time. All of the participants fully consented to taking part. Full names were 
not disclosed during the conversations, and were completely removed from the transcripts 
and write up. This was in part due to the wish of a number of the participants to remain 
anonymous, and in part due to potential conflict of interest with the institution in which the 
participants studied.  
 
Findings and discussion  
Dyslexia is constructed in the focus group texts as a moral label, though this is arguably 
obscured by its primary construction as a scientific category. Such scientific categories or 
‘natural kinds’ as Hacking names them ‘usually present themselves as scientific and hence as 
value-free, but they have often been brought into being by judgements of good and evil’ 
(Hacking, 1995: 354). This is no less the case here. The discussion below is divided in to 
three sections which, in turn, consider the interaction between the power of the grade as a 
marker of worth and the status of the dyslexia label; the tensions between acknowledging 
difficulties with writing and the construction of high literacy as morally aspirational; and the 
uncertain, yet persistent, construction of dyslexia as a valuable label and a moral good. 
 
Key to transcription:  
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[  ] – square brackets indicate overlapping speech 
, - comma indicates brief pause 
. – full stop indicates downward intonation and longer pause 
 
The power of the grade 
Throughout the focus group conversations the participants’ position within the educational 
system was the most prominent in the stories they told of being ‘diagnosed’, and ‘succeeding’ 
or ‘failing’.  Particularly prominent in the conversations were grades given for coursework 
and exams, teachers’ judgments of their ability, and comparison of themselves with peers. 
Below are a couple of extracts in which some of the participants talk about their frustration 
with their progress at school: 
 
C: well, when I was at high school, in, like year year ten or eleven, erm, with my  
    English teacher,  I didn’t really get on with her, and I think it was because maybe      
    we both didn’t know that I was dyslexic, but my grammar and my English was both   
    really rubbish, and I was getting like Ds and Cs when I was predicted As, and I  
    just couldn’t understand, like I was doing everything she told me, like I went for  
    extra help [and ev]erything [and   ] it just got really  
H:                 [yeah   ]               [yeah] 
 
C: frustrating that she was, like, no, it’s still wrong. And she wasn’t very positive  
    about it? And it was really frustrating to be, like, well I’m doing what you’ve asked  
    me to do, but it’s still [not], still not getting the grades, [erm] 
H:                                 [yeh]                                             [yuh] 
 
 
B: I think it was frustrating with like English coursework, like the, I didn’t seem to be  
     able to improve [it, erm] 
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C:                           [yeah, I] had the same. 
 
R: you know, erm, it would be a C, and I’d rewrite it, erm and then, you know try and  
     improve and, would there’s be writing all over it and I would you know, rewrite it,  
    and it would still be a C, hhh. Seemed so unfair. 
 
R: and it was was just frustrating esp especially because I was in a class for gifted  
    and talented, class for gifted English people and that that was at the end of year 9  
    and then by the end of GCSEs I was getting Cs and others in those classes were  
    getting As and A stars, and I was supposed to be this gifted and talented student  
    and I was getting Cs hhh. 
 
H: yeah yeh. 
D: mmm 
 
In the first of the extracts above, the ‘when’ of her experience, as marked by her school year, 
and the presence of her English teacher is presented as the forefront to C’s experience of 
frustration.  ‘[Y]ear ten or eleven’ may be seen deictically here, in that it assumes an 
understanding in the group of the importance of these years for GCSE exam grades and the 
run up to A-Levels. ‘I’ as the subject is maintained throughout this conversational turn: ‘I 
didn’t really get on with her…’, ‘I think…’, ‘I was dyslexic’, ‘I was predicted As’, ‘I just 
couldn’t understand…’, ‘I was doing everything she told me’, and ‘I went for extra help’.  In 
doing so, C places the focus on her own agency and action, and therefore we can understand 
the process through which one gets As as out of C’s control; that is, there must have been 
something else going on.  ‘I was predicted As’ says C, using the passive form where the 
agent, presumably the teacher, is removed. The passive structure here helps to construct the 
prediction as the fairer representation of her ability because it hides the human (and 
presumably more subjective) element, and is an obvious mismatch with the grades she was 
actually getting.  
9 
 
In constructing her story, C also draws on apparently shared understandings of the meanings 
of grades (Ds and Cs in this case being inferior, and A representing excellence), the role of 
the teacher in pushing students to raise their grades, and the power relationship between 
teacher and student in which the former has the role of formally judging the other.  We hear 
the voice of the teacher indirectly with ‘she was, like, no, it’s still wrong’.  The response of 
the teacher, in this story fits ideologically with the conception of teacher control as one of the 
‘instruments of normalisation’, (Collinson & Penketh, 2009:10) in that the ‘wrongness’ of 
C’s work is only something that the teacher can confer, and the student cannot dispute. In this 
story, however, the power relationship is retrospectively reversed, and C is able to construct 
the teacher in a way that positions C as unfairly treated, hard-working, and deserving of an 
‘A’ grade (‘I was predicted As’).  The ‘She’ as the subject refers to the teacher, who ‘wasn’t 
very positive’ and who apparently unfairly accused C of lack of effort or ability.  The ‘I’ is 
always compared favourably to the ‘she’ in this story. Implicitly, C seems to be saying – ‘if 
only my teacher and I had known I was dyslexic; it would have been different’.   
A number of assumptions are arguably present in C’s talk in this extract which are 
maintained by the other participants in later conversational turns: firstly, grades (and 
qualifications) are generally treated as unproblematic representations of worth and ability; 
that is, although C did not think Ds or Cs were a fair reflection upon her, she did not question 
the ‘truth’ of the grades, but questioned herself: ‘I just couldn’t understand, like I was doing 
everything she told me’ implying she  doubted herself at the time. It is only the retrospective 
realisation that she is dyslexic which appears to allow C to construct herself as 
misunderstood, someone who was, in fact, intelligent.  ‘Being’ dyslexic in this sense was a 
tool for C to resist others’ constructions of her as someone with low status; she is ‘safe’ in 
this story from such accusations. C comes close to blaming the teacher for her difficulties, but 
even the teacher is forgiven in the understanding that she did not know she was dyslexic.  The 
dyslexia provides a useful explanation for C, and means she need not look further afield for 
answers (for example, to the system that graded her). This use of the label gives strength to 
concerns in the literature about those who are not given the label of dyslexia, but instead 
described as having general difficulties with reading or struggling across domains (Ho, 2004; 
Elliot & Grigorenko, 2014). However, the label dyslexia does not appear to rid the bearer of 
stigma altogether: for these participants, it merely helps them shift membership from a group 
considered inferior to another considered slightly less inferior. The stigma attached to receipt 
of lower grades and literacy difficulties is not erased (Collinson & Penketh, 2009).  
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B and R in the second extract presented above, like C, also narrate their frustration about not 
achieving the grade they felt they were worthy of, and their lack of understanding about how 
this could be the case when they were working hard, and when they had the ‘intelligence’.  
The word ‘frustrating’ is used by C, R and B and they each make similar use of the ‘I’ as the 
agentful subject in their reflections.  R uses the modal ‘would’ repeatedly, which adds force 
to her positive self-construction by producing her effort and determination as something that 
was a habit for her at that time. ‘Seemed so unfair’ said R, not to be given the grade deserved.  
The word ‘seemed’ is used in place of the more obvious ‘was’ here.  If R had said it ‘was’ 
unfair,  a statement of stable fact, she would have been casting the grading system into doubt, 
when in fact, at this point in the conversation, the emphasis is being placed upon the dyslexia 
as the culprit, not the system. The past tense of ‘seemed’ also permits the possibility that it 
actually turned out not to be unfair; but the fault of the dyslexia.  Moreover, ‘Gifted and 
talented’ is recognisable as a phrase popularised by educational policy, and offers superior 
intellectual status. R’s use of the term provides an avenue into the conversation for discourses 
of individual differences, biological determinism, and intellectual hierarchy; a ‘gift’ is 
something you are either endowed with naturally or not, and the very existence of ‘gifted and 
talented’ pupils automatically produces the ‘rest’ who are ungifted and talent-less. For R, 
however, her designation as ‘gifted and talented’ appeared to construct her as necessarily 
lazy, as why else would she not be ‘succeeding’? ‘Being dyslexic’ did seem to have an 
important role to play in reducing the power of the grade, and in offering an explanation for 
educational ‘failure’ for some of the participants in these conversations. However, receiving 
the dyslexia label is unlikely to free a student from their grade-based position in the 
educational hierarchy, even should it release them from an element of blame (as Elliot & 
Grigorenko, 2014, explain). 
 
The following extract is from R, again: 
 
R: for me, it’s like my spoken intelligence is a lot higher than my written intelligence,  
     so when I am doing a piece of course work I don’t feel it does represent my best  
    [work] 
H: [yeah] 
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R: so for me, it’s getting the knowledge from in my head, onto the paper. There’s  
     something that doesn’t quite connect. 
 
H: yeah 
R: mmm 
 
The ‘for me’ in line one and repeated in line 5, performs the function of constructing the 
speaker, (R), as non-judgemental of others’ experiences, and also makes her claim to 
intelligence incontestable (as no one can dispute what something is like ‘for me’). R’s 
presentation of herself as having high ‘spoken intelligence’ allows her to maintain the 
concept of ‘intelligence’ as a thing inside her, while providing an explanation for why she is 
graded ‘poorly’ for written work. The dyslexia is an aid to this construction because it 
provides a socially legitimate reason for how the ‘written intelligence’ could be recorded as 
poor, despite the ‘true’ intelligence being high. For students not in the ‘A-grade’ category, 
there is little available in terms of discursive resources to combat the flawed educational 
identity allotted.  Being dyslexic can be part of such resistance. The may be due, in part, to 
the popular assumption, in some quarters, that the dyslexia label is only given to people with 
above average ‘intelligence’ (Elliot & Grigorenko, 2014), even though this connection has 
long since been debunked (Stanovich, 1991). There remains an amount of confusion, 
therefore, which condemns dyslexia to shift awkwardly between being an indicator of flawed 
intellectual performance and being a mark of intelligence. The moral positions attached to 
both of these are contradictory.     
 
Aspiring to high literacy 
Although for most of the participants in the current study, difficulties with literacy were 
narrated as very familiar and significant, there were a number of instances where they 
constructed a high standard of literacy as a necessary part of being ‘academic’ and something 
they aspired to. Below is an extract in which D and H construct respect for written literacy, 
and a desire to be accomplished in it.  
 
D: I mean you have to learn to write, in some respects, so probably [a] little bit  
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H:                                                                                                        [yeh] 
D: is not that bad 
 
D: [but] so [oth]erwise you’ll just never learn, or function in society. 
H: [yeh]     [no]                                              yeah. 
D says ‘I mean you have to learn to write’; he softens his statement with ‘in some respects’ 
and ‘a little bit is not that bad’, before directly constructing writing as a social necessity, and 
even as a moral obligation.  His discourse here is quite powerful stuff: he begins ‘I mean’.  ‘I 
mean’ can be a device in spoken English which begins statements of self-evident ‘fact’, and 
not just personal opinion. ‘I mean’ often goes with phrases like ‘what you’ve got to 
understand is…’, or ‘the thing is’, and here D choses an equally strong second clause: ‘you 
have to learn to write’. Again we hear ‘have to’ for conferring a rule-based obligation, and 
one wonders according to whom have we to.  In fact, D follows through with the warning of 
what will happen if one does not follow this rule; namely, the general ‘you’ will become 
socially dysfunctional.  This accords with an ideological perspective which places literacy as 
‘fundamental to life’ and constructs those who do not learn to read and write to a particular 
standard as of lesser value (Tanner, 2009: 785). Contexts which require high literacy 
therefore exclude and stigmatise those who cannot perform in the expected ways (Collinson 
& Penketh, 2013). As such, it is quite understandable that dyslexia would be sought as a less 
damning explanation (Gibbs & Elliott, 2010).  
In the extract below, N narrates his past difficulty with aspects of written literacy. N was 
undertaking PhD study at the time of this conversation, and like D, had become ‘successful’ 
in academia.  N jokingly boasts about his newfound ability to use ‘bigger words’.  N perhaps 
shows here a degree of self-awareness he is playing a game in which the trick is to trick the 
educators.  However, there is still the possibility that in his identity as someone who learnt to 
play the game, he is left with the concern he is cheating.  There is constructed a difference 
between being able to do academic writing ‘naturally’ and just tricking people into thinking 
you do (see Lea & Street, 1998, on the ideological construction of academic literacy in higher 
education).   
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N: er grammar wise. I really struggled with my grammar, and possibly sentence  
    structure, quite long sentences, etc.  
H: mm 
J: yeah 
 
N: but you know, I learnt a lot, in. yeah. Definitely a positive, [and now] I 
H:                                                                                             [mm yeh] 
 
N: can write really well, and people say I write really well, which is all down to the   
     support I got in creating my sentences [and I always                        ] look 
H:                                                                [yeah that’s really interesting] 
 
N: for bigger words when I write as well.  
H: mmm 
 
N: like ‘that’s too small; [I can do ]better than that! [where’s the thesaurus?]’  
General:                        [hh. Yeah]                          [hahahahahhhhhhhh     ] 
 
‘[N]ow I can write really well, and people say I write really well’ says N. It is interesting that 
N separates what ‘I can’ do from what ‘people say’ into two separate clauses; the second 
clause appears to add validity to the first.  We assume that ‘people’ are significant others 
whose opinion is to be respected, and after all it is others’ opinions of our written work that 
confers the status.  It also reflects the value of writing over oral expression that is well-
established within higher education (see Friere, 1996, for a discussion of the neglected role of 
oral communication within the academy). We write for an audience, and at university this is 
an audience with a particular set of expectations around what constitutes quality.  As for D, 
now that N has achieved a certain ‘standard’ in this writing that is acceptable to the academy, 
it serves him to subscribe to the underlying ideological position; in spite of the fact that 
achieving the academic status he has may have involved difficulties with literacy not 
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experienced by his peers.  On the other hand, it may be because of the additional effort N has 
had to invest into his academic identity that his allegiance to particular discourses is 
maintained. The powerful ideas at work within and around our educational institutions mean 
that it may be difficult to construct a positive identity when one has difficulties with literacy 
(Lea & Street, 1998). This may be the case in spite of the potential freedom from blame the 
dyslexia label can confer (Elliot & Grigoranko, 2014; Tanner, 2009; Burden, 2005).   
 
Value in the label 
‘Cure’ is normally a medical term, used in relation to diseases and illnesses, and implies 
complete removal of ‘symptoms’, as opposed to ‘treatment’, which may be independent of 
‘cure’. The words ‘treatment’ and ‘symptoms’ are frequently used in literature and reports on 
dyslexia, though ‘cure’ is less common.  There have been claims for ‘cures’, however (see the 
now discredited Dore Programme, Goldacre, 2006).  The idea of a cure for dyslexia was 
discussed by participants, and in general, being cured was not considered desirable. Here are 
S, H and B talking about this question: 
 
S: I’m also like, a little afraid, what if it’s that, you cure the dyslexia, and I find I’m still  
     I’m [‘Ive still] hhh got all these problems hhhhh 
H:       [still hh  ] 
B:        [hhahah] 
 
S: hh. It’ quite frightening. But yes, it’s a possibility that, yes, actually, these  
     problems, these problems are possibly just a character defect that I don’t sort of,  
     do that. 
 
H: oh hhhhhh.  
 
Without the label, the same problems become morally unacceptable ‘character defect[s]’.  It 
is interesting how socially powerful a label can be in transforming something from a moral 
bad to a moral good with no other change beyond the name. The idea of a character defect 
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was left unchallenged in the conversation, which implies that the existence of such a thing 
was accepted. It is also interesting that the challenges associated with dyslexia could even 
potentially be considered deficiencies in ‘character’, rather than difficulties with specific 
‘abilities’. There is arguably here an echo of our history of the ‘deficient’ or the ‘disabled’ as 
social misfits who have something wrong with them that is socially abhorrent.  Declaring the 
‘disability’ as a thing they want to be rid of in these conversations arguably requires a hidden 
acknowledgement that as individuals they are a social problem: ‘for a disabled person to seek 
or desire a cure, worthlessness is often implied…conflict between a desire to be ‘cured’ and 
how this desire is interpreted by others is inevitable’ (Carr and Hartnett, 1996: 9).   
 
Desiring dyslexia 
C: An’ also, like, I guess because I found that so difficult, it kind of made me feel like  
     I wasn’t wasting their time? and I wasn’t going I dunno, be like, well, you’re not  
     dyslexic, n’ you’ve wasted a whole day. Like, it was nice, [like   ]  
H:                                                                                             [yeah] 
 
C: again, to feel, like, it’s sort of like, understanding that you have got it, sort of    
     [thing].  
H: [mmm] yeah. yeah.  
 
‘[T]hat’ in the first line above refers to the dyslexia assessment, and ‘their’ in the second line 
refers to the psychologist who administered the test; ‘their’ can be used as a reference to a 
single person when one does not want or need to mention the gender (i.e. ‘his’ or ‘her’) but it 
may also mean that C considers the psychologist one representative of a specific group of 
professionals who are involved in her diagnosis, or to mean that psychology itself is a ‘they’ 
or a ‘them’, an indeterminate body of experts. ‘[I]t kind of made me feel like I wasn’t wasting 
their time’ says C. It is interesting that C talks of ‘their’ time being wasted, rather than her 
own, as this arguably constructs the ‘expert’s’ time as more valuable than hers, and by 
implication, the expert as more important. This line also suggests that had she not been found 
dyslexic, the assessor would have thought C to be a fraud not worthy of the attention she had 
got, and a time-waster. For C in this story, the assessor has the power to tell her for certain 
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whether or not she has ‘got it’.  ‘[G]ot it’ places the dyslexia as a thing (an ‘it’) which C 
possesses, and in having this thing, C cannot be a time-waster, but someone who was worthy 
the whole time. There is certainly little doubt that in this story, C wants to be ‘diagnosed’ as 
the alternative may have negative implications for her identity.  
 
When constructed as a socially acceptable ‘diagnosis’ that is in some cases desirable as an 
explanation, the label itself becomes ‘cherished’ (Gibbs & Elliot, 2010: 298) and something 
worth protecting. Below, S is talking about people who disingenuously ‘went for’ the 
dyslexia label for the resources they thought they would get.  
 
S: when we did it in house, a lot of people weren’t, weren’t. I mean I might be, like,  
     largely biased, but cos I knew there were a lot of people who went for this were  
     sort of very lazy arrogant [people] who would take the piss out of you 
H:                                          [yeah   ] 
 
S: having [dyslexia] but you know, as soon as they realised you could 
H:             [yeah     ] 
 
S: (unclear) 
 
H: yeah that’s quite scary. 
D: mmm 
 
S: yeah, so they might realise they do have dyslexia, but if they don’t have dyslexia,  
     then they are giving it a really bad [name] 
H:                                                        [yeah ] 
D:                                                         [it      ] kind of makes me feel guilty because  
     sometimes I feel like I’m faking it, and then I’ll mess something up  
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      [you’ll, then          ] you kind of do value whether you do have it or not.  
S:  [yeh but you don’t] 
 
We are invited to make the connection that it is the same people who went for the test 
disingenuously who were also lazy and arrogant and who took the piss. ‘I knew’ is an 
expression of certainty, and ‘lazy’ and ‘arrogant’ are here are presented as factual 
descriptions.  They are further constructed as morally undeserving of the dyslexia label 
because they ‘would take the piss out of you having dyslexia’. S acknowledges that ‘they 
might realise they do have dyslexia’ and therefore, are genuine, ‘but if they don’t have 
dyslexia, then they are giving it a really bad name’.  This last suggests the label is worth 
protecting from imposters, and it also suggests that being dyslexic is something you can fake.  
If the latter is the case, it casts doubt upon the air-tight ‘diagnoses’ of scientific professionals.  
It is also possible that the more people ‘diagnosed’, the less unique being dyslexic becomes.  
Furthermore, if ‘lazy’ people begin to be diagnosed with dyslexia, this will taint the 
reputation of dyslexic people being harder-workers than others, if we follow the line of 
thinking drawn by S.  
 
D completes this extract with a wobble of self-doubt: ‘kind of makes me feel guilty because 
sometimes I feel like I’m faking it’, and this construction of guilt is undertaken by other 
participants other times in the focus groups. The ‘I feel like’ ensures others do not imagine he 
is actually faking it (compare with the phrase ‘sometimes I am faking it’ which would be 
morally unacceptable in this context), and he completes his sentence with an ‘and then’ 
headed clause which repositions him as undoubtedly genuine, not at all like the characters in 
S’s narrative, and he reiterates the ‘value’ of ‘having it’.  The extract above is another in the 
category of those which construct a moral glow around ‘being dyslexic’ that is juxtaposed to 
the ideologically and historically constructed meanings of laziness and stupidity, and the fear 
of being ‘vilified as lazy, ignorant or unintelligent’, as Gibbs and Elliot (2010: 298) put it. A 
further such extract follows below: 
 
 
J: mmm I think, when I went and they tried to describe to me what dyslexia was, it  
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     [was like          ] highly above average in something and then  
H: [keep going      ] 
 
J: like dramatically, having that difference across the, and [test] 
G:                                                                                        [yeah] and if you’re just not  
     very good in general [then you’ve] obviously not got dyslexia. 
J:                                    [yeah,mmm] 
 
G: hhhhh 
M: that’s if then stupidity hhh 
 
J’s reference to ‘they’ in the first line indicates the educational psychologist, and preludes 
discussion of how dyslexia is identified. Referring to averages constructs psychology’s norms 
and measurable individual differences as truths and common sense. J only states the ‘highly 
above average’ aspect; missing is the statement ‘and greatly below average in other things’ 
which was left unspoken.  It is telling that the ‘below average’ part was left out, and the 
‘above average’ was present. J’s ‘dramatically’ also emphasises the specialness of the 
diagnosis, and suggests it is not something anyone can get (see Elliott & Grigorenko, 2014 
for the label as covetable). 
G’s response is telling of the dyslexia identity as a moral good: her ‘yeah’ immediately aligns 
her view with J’s, and her line ‘if you’re just not very good in general then you’ve obviously 
not got dyslexia’ is heavy with what it misses out.  G might equally have said ‘if you are just 
very good in general then you’ve obviously not got dyslexia’ (first ‘not’ missing).  In her use 
of ‘not’ G separates herself and the other participants (and others who are dyslexic) from the 
group of people who are ‘just not very good in general’.  Her ‘obviously’ places the 
separation as beyond doubt. M finishes off with what seems to have been an understood but 
as yet unspoken sentiment ‘that’s if then stupidity hhh’. He states the point they have 
gradually constructed together, that you cannot be dyslexic and stupid (again see concerns of 
Elliot and Grigorenko, 2014).  
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Conclusion  
Dyslexia can be understood in a number of different ways, some of which link those so 
labelled with greater moral or social worth than others. The context is all important, as is the 
shared knowledge about dyslexia and education in any particular group at a given time and 
place. Within higher education, particularly in those institutions and disciplines where being 
highly literate is valued above other performances, talk about ability in reading, writing and 
subject knowledge (as measured by that institution) is morally loaded. Being dyslexic can be 
an escape from accusations of moral and intellectual inferiority which appear still to be 
connected to people who struggle with particular culturally valued performances like reading, 
writing, memorising, and expressing academic ideas quickly and articulately. However, the 
power of the dyslexia label to offer an escape from these undesirable positions can rest upon 
how dyslexia is conceptualised and by whom in any given context.  The knowledge that some 
people think of dyslexia as a myth or an excuse, or as a kind of mental retardation, means that 
dyslexic students are unlikely to feel secure in the way they share their identification with 
others, and in their decisions about the extent to which they ought to take reasonable 
adjustments in the name of dyslexia.  
As they move up the education system to become undergraduates and possibly postgraduates, 
students have arguably invested in their status as academic; and for some of the participants 
this seemed to mean subscribing to the construction of high literacy as a central indicator of 
worth, even though they might contest this position when challenged. These uncertainties 
were complicit in the conversations around fairness and blame in the focus group 
conversations. The students appeared to say they deserved help and understanding as long as 
they were putting in a lot of effort, and as long as there was evidence of underlying 
intelligence and moral worth which meant they deserved to be in academia. Arguably often 
present was the fear that a far worse ‘character defect’ (as one student put it) might be the 
genuine culprit, which once revealed would confirm their moral inferiority. Moral inferiority 
appears to invite blame: the blame of others, or the blame of oneself. 
Whether or not to acknowledge dyslexia was therefore not straightforward for the participants 
in this study. It was a risky business.  Dyslexic students, to different degrees perhaps, have to 
negotiate their own positions as learners with a label, and they have to accept or find ways to 
resist those discourses which they come across from psychologists, from stories in the press, 
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online, and from their peers, families and educators. They also have to find ways of managing 
the way they take on identities as people with certain kinds of abilities and difficulties. This 
might mean playing down their difficulties in some contexts and emphasising them in others; 
it might mean constructing dyslexia as an innate, eternal neurological deficiency in some 
contexts, while at other times producing it as an environmental consequence. This is a 
particular burden that students without labels do not carry.  
This paper argues that a more systematic and nuanced approach to staff training and student 
support would help to make higher education more inclusive for students with learning 
differences such as dyslexia.  A case for such an approach in schools has already been made 
(see Davis & Deponio, 2014). For practice in higher education, this would mean a move 
away from reliance upon generic tips for ‘dealing with’ dyslexic students, which may 
encourage teachers to feel they have ticked the inclusion box once they have attended to such 
a list. It would mean a move towards more systematic incorporation of staff training and 
development focused explicitly upon raising awareness of the politically and socially situated 
meaning of words like dyslexia, intelligence, equality and ability. Such training should make 
space for reflection upon how the ways we talk about learning and ‘ability’ help to produce 
different kinds of learner, or subtly apportion blame or praise; and would help to reveal the 
complexities surrounding celebration of neurodiversity within institutions functioning under 
capitalism (Runswick-Cole, 2014). It would also be hugely valuable to hold similar 
discussions with student groups during an early stage in their degree so that they can reflect 
upon the ways in which the educational environment can encourage them to rank themselves 
and each other according to grade or perceived academic ability. There is an urgent need 
work to explore more thoroughly how such development could be structured. 
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